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Abstract
We study both empirically and theoretically the consequences of introduc-
ing a conditional cash transfer scheme for the distribution of program impacts.
Intuitively, if the conditioned-on good is normal, then better-off households
tend to receive a larger positive impact. I formalize this insight by means of
a simple model of child labor, applying the Nash-Bargaining approach as the
solution concept. A series of tests for heterogeneity in program impacts are
developed and applied to Progresa, an anti-poverty program in Mexico. It can
be concluded that this program exhibits a lot of heterogeneity in treatment
effects. Consistent with the model, and under the assumption of rank preserva-
tion, program impacts are distributionally regressive, although positive, within
the treated population
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1 Introduction
Nowadays, conditional cash transfer schemes (CCTS) constitute a key element of
many anti-poverty programs around the world. Following Das, Do, and Oler (2004),
a conditional cash transfer scheme can be broadly defined as ”...any scheme requiring
a specified course of action in order to receive a benefit as a conditional cash trans-
fer”. Examples of programs implementing CCTS are Oportunidades in Mexico, Red
de Proteccion Social in Nicaragua, and Bolsa Familia in Brazil. The aim of these
programs is to alleviate today’s poverty by transferring money to poor families, and
to short-circuit tomorrow’s, by making the transfers conditional. The conditionality
usually operates through lower bounds on human capital investment which takes the
form of requiring a minimum attendance rate to school, and constant health moni-
toring for the children.
What is the rationale behind imposing a conditionality to the beneficiaries of a
social program? if individuals are rational, there are no externalities, and policymak-
ers have full information, then there is no case for implementing CCTS. However,
these conditions are rarely met. If individuals are not fully rational, imposing a con-
ditionality may help them to increase their own welfare. For instance, if a beneficiary
is time inconsistent, then if may be optimal to impose the condition that transfers
should be received in several payments.1 If information is asymmetric in the sense
that the policymaker does not have some relevant information of the beneficiaries
such as income and asset holdings, then CCTS can be used as a screening mechanism
with the specific purpose of improving the targeting efficiency of the program. For
example, if the conditioned-on good is inferior, richer households are more likely to
be screened out of the program (Besley and Coate 1992).
There is a third rational for CCTS. In the presence of externalities, individuals
do not internalize the effect of their choices on others. By imposing a conditionality,
1See chapter 2 in this dissertation.
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policymakers may be able to move individuals towards a more efficient equilibrium.
One notorious case is that of child labor and human capital investment: parents
usually decide children’s time allocation between education and work. Since the
economic benefits of child labor are immediately felt, and the economic benefits of
education are only feasible in the long run, parents may not internalize the benefits of
human capital investment in their children. Therefore, CCTS can be used in this case
to restore efficiency by imposing lower bounds on variables such as school attendance.
Although CCTS may help policymakers to reach a more efficient economy and to
reduce poverty in the long run by increasing investments on human capital today (so
the children of the poor may escape poverty in the future), they could imply a tradeoff
between the equity and efficiency goals of policymakers, at least in the short run. In
particular, if the conditioned-on good is normal, then worse off households may be
receiving less ”effective” transfers than other groups of beneficiaries if participating
in the program imposes some sort of opportunity cost such as foregone wages from
child labor.
A good example of this tension is The Female Stipend Program in Bangladesh.
This program gives stipends to girls who attend at least 85% of classes at a secondary
school level with the explicit goal of increasing investment on human capital. All girls
can participate in this program independently of their socioeconomic background.
Since education is usually a normal good, richer households are more likely to enroll
their daughters in secondary schools than households in the low tail of the income
distribution. Besides, the opportunity cost of enrolling a child into school or making
the 85% lower bound on school attendance is more likely to exceed the benefits
obtained from the stipend for the poorest households. Khandker et al (2003) notice
that the ”...untargeted stipend disproportionally affects the school enrollments of girls
from households with larger land wealth. Targeting towards the land poor may reduce
the overall enrollment gains of the program while equalizing enrollment effects across
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landholding classes.”
Despite the potential effects that CCTS programs have on the distribution of treat-
ment effects, most existing research on program evaluation of anti-poverty programs
focuses on mean impacts. There are, however, some studies for developed countries
that take the issue of heterogeneity in program impacts into account. In an excellent
study about heterogeneity in program impacts, Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997)
find strong evidence of heterogeneous impacts when evaluating the US Job Training
Partnership Act. In a similar spirit, Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes (2003) study the
Connecticut’s Job First program; they conclude that this welfare program exhibits a
lot of heterogeneity in program impacts, just as predicted by standard labor supply
theory.
In this paper, we study the distribution of program impacts in Progresa, recently
renamed Oportunidades. This anti-poverty program was introduced by the Mexican
government in 1997 and provides conditional cash transfers to poor families. Similar
to The Female Stipend Program in Bangladesh, the conditioned-on good is school
attendance which, not surprisingly, is a normal good in the case of Mexico (Lopez-
Acevedo and Salinas 2000). We take advantage of the experimental design of the
evaluation sample to identify the parameters of interest for this study.
Our empirical findings can be summarized in two main points. First, there is
strong evidence that heterogeneity in program impacts is a common phenomenon in
Progresa. Second, under the assumption of perfect positive dependence, and consis-
tent with the model developed in this paper, better off households tend to receive
larger positive program impacts than poorer households.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes Progresa, the evaluation
sample, and the selection of beneficiaries. Section 3 develops a simple household
bargaining model of child labor and human capital accumulation, and discusses its
connection with CCTS. Section 4 briefly analyzes the evaluation problem and presents
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average treatment effects of the program as a benchmark case. Section 5 develops
some tests for homogeneity in program impacts. Section 6 imposes a specific type of
monotonicity assumption: rank preservation, and makes this assumption operational
through the estimation of quantile treatment effects (QTE). Section 7 concludes.
Mathematical details, algorithms, and proofs are in the Appendices.
2 Progresa
In 1997, the Mexican government introduced the Programa de Educacion, Salud
y Alimentacion (the Education, Health, and Nutrition Program), better known as
Progresa, and recently renamed Oportunidades, as an important element of its more
general strategy to eradicate poverty in Mexico. The program is characterized by a
multiplicity of objectives such as improving the educational, health, and nutritional
status of poor families.
Progresa provides cash transfers, in-kind health benefits, and nutritional suple-
ments to beneficiary families. Moreover, the delivery of the cash transfers is exclu-
sively through the mothers, and is linked to children’s enrollment and school atten-
dance. The conditionality works as follows: in localities where Progresa operates,
those households classified as poor with children enrolled in grades 3 to 9 are eli-
gible to receive the grant every two months. The average bi-monthly payment to
a beneficiary family amounts to 20 percent of the value of bi-monthly consumption
expenditures prior to the beginning of the program. Moreover, these grants are esti-
mated taking into account the opportunity cost of sending children to school, given
the characteristics of the labor market, household production, and gender differences.
By the end of 2002, nearly 4.24 million families (around 20 percent of all Mexican
households) were incorporated into the program. These households constitute around
77 percent of those households considered to be in extreme poverty.
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2.1 Data: A Quasi-Experimental Design
Because of logistical and financial constraints, the program was introduced in sev-
eral phases. This sequentiality in the implementation of the Progresa was capitalized
by randomly selecting 506 localities in the states of Guerrero, Hidalgo, Michoacan,
Puebla, Queretaro, San Luis Potosi and Veracruz. Of the 506 localities, 320 localities
were assigned to the treatment group and the rest were assigned to the control group.
In total, 24,077 households were selected to participate in the evaluation sample. The
first evaluation survey took place in March 1998, 2 months before the distribution
of benefits started. 3 rounds of surveys took place afterwards: October/November
1998, June 1999, and November 1999. The localities that served as control group
started receiving benefits by December 2000. For the empirical application of the
methodologies developed in this paper, we will make use of the June 1999 round.
2.2 Progresa’s selection of localities and beneficiary house-
holds
Progresa’s methodology to identify potential beneficiaries consists of two two main
stages: (1) the selection of localities; (2) the selection of beneficiary households within
selected localities. For the first stage, a marginality index was constructed for each
locality in Mexico. Based on this index, localities deemed to have a high marginality
level and with more than 50 and less than 2,500 inhabitants were considered priorities
for the program. Finally, budgetary constraints as well as program components that
require the presence of school and clinics for the implementation of the program were
considered to select the group of localities to be covered by the Progresa. For the
second stage, a census, ENCASEH (Encuesta de Caracteristicas Socioeconomics de los
Hogares), was conducted in each of the selected localities. Using this data, a measure
of monthly per capita income per household was constructed subtracting child income
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from total household income. A poverty line of 320 pesos per capita per month was
employed to create a new binary variable taking the value of 1 if household’s monthly
per capita income was below 320 pesos and 0 otherwise. Finally, discriminant analysis
was employed for each geographical region. By doing so, it was possible to identify the
variables that discriminate best between poor and non-poor households, and a rule to
classify households as poor or non-poor was developed by estimating a discriminant
score for each household.
3 A Simple Model of Human Capital Investment
and CCTS
In this section, we present a simple model of child labor and human capital invest-
ment. Our objective is to shed some light on the connection between these variables
and CCTS. We build this model as an extension of Baland and Robinson (2000),
although we do not adopt a unitary view of the household. Similar to Kanbur and
Haddad (1997) and Martinelli and Parker (2003), we adopt a bargaining perspective
for the intra-household resource allocation problem.
3.1 One-Sided Altruism
We consider a one-good economy. The single good in this economy is produced
with the linear technology
Y = L (1)
where L is labor input measured in efficiency units of labor. We assume that the
labor market is perfectly competitive.
There is a continuum of households who live for two periods, t = 1, 2. Each of these
households is composed by a man, a woman, and a child. We will refer to the man and
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the woman together as the parents for the rest of the section. In period 1, parents are
characterized by their income generating ability a, where a also represents efficiency
units of labor. We assume that households are distributed uniformly on [a, a], with
each household inelastically supplying a efficiency units of labor per period.
In period 1, the child is endowed with one unit of time. Parents decide how to
allocate the child’s time between child labor, l, and human capital accumulation, h.
They also decide how much to leave as a bequest to the child, b. For the sake of
simplicity, it is assumed that l is measured in efficiency units of labor, so the child is
endowed with one efficiency unit of labor in period 1. In the second period, the child’s
income generating ability is given by φ(h), where h = 1 − l and φ(·) is C2, strictly
increasing, and strictly concave function defined on [0, 1], with φ(0) = 1, φ′(1) < 1,
and φ′(0) > 1. This technology implies that the efficient investment level on human
capital, ho, is given implicitly by φ′(ho) = 1.2
Let (x1f , x2f ) and (x1m, x2m) denote the consumption levels of the father and the
mother for periods 1 and 2, respectively. The child is assumed to consume only in
period 2, with consumption level denoted by xc. The woman cares only about her own
consumption and the consumption of the child; similarly, the man cares only about
his own consumption and the consumption of the child. The father’s preferences are
represented by
Wf = α(lnx1f + ln x2f ) + (1− α) ln xc (2)
and the mother’s preferences are given by
Wm = β(lnx1m + ln x2m) + (1− β) lnxc (3)
where 1 > α > β > 0.
Besides choosing the time allocation of the child, parents can also decide to make
2In other words, ho is the level of human capital that maximizes the household’s intertemporal
income.
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positive bequests to him. We denote these bequest by b ∈ R+. Parents have access to
a storage technology, so they can transfer resources between periods by saving. We
denote the household’s saving level by s. Households are borrowing constrained in
the sense that parents can save but not borrow. Therefore, parents face the budget
constraints
x1f + x1m = a+ l − s (4)
x2f + x2m = a+ s− b, (5)
and
xc = φ(1− l) + b (6)
Decisions about x1f , x2f , x1m, x2m, xc, b, and s are made by the parents in the first
period by solving a generalized Nash bargaining problem with solution given by the
following program
Max(xα1fx
α
2fx
1−α
c − uf )γ(xβ1mxβ2mx1−βc − um)1−γ (7)
The paremeter γ ∈ (0, 1) introduces asymmetry into the model. The ratio γ
1−γ can
be interpreted as as the relative bargaining power of the father with respect to the
mother. uf and um are referred to as threat points or disagreement points. For the
rest of the analysis we assume uf = um = 0.
Proposition 1 If savings and bequests are interior, then parents are investing the
efficient level of human capital on the child. Moreover, human capital is a normal
good.
PROOF: See Appendix.
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3.2 Two-Sided Altruism
We now introduce a particular form of altruism from children to parents. We will
show that the results we obtained above can be extended to this new setting. We
assume that children derive utility both from consumption in the second period and
from any transfer to their parents:
Wc = pi ln xc + (1− pi) ln τ c (8)
where xc is child’s consumption when adult, τ
c is the transfer given to the parents,
and pi ∈ (0, 1).
Household choices are timed as follows. In period 1, parents choose investment
on human capital and saving. Period 2 is divided in two subperiods. In the first
subperiod, they choose the level of bequests. In the second subperiod, children decide
how much to transfer to their parents. Therefore, they face the following budget
constraint:
xc + τ
c = φ(1− l) + b (9)
We solve for the equilibrium by backward induction. For the second subperiod, it
is easy to show that children choose the following levels of own consumption and
transfers to their parents:
xc = pi(φ(1− l) + b) (10)
τ c = (1− pi)(φ(1− l) + b) (11)
Since both parents are assumed to be forward looking, parents anticipate the effect
that their current decisions have both on child consumption and the transfers received
from him. Therefore, the solution to the Nash bargaining problem is given by the
solution to
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Max(xα1fx
α
2f (φ(1− l) + b)1−α)γ(xβ1mxβ2m(φ(1− l) + b)1−β)1−γ (12)
subject to the constraints
x1f + x1m = a+ l − s (13)
x2f + x2m = a+ s+ (1− pi)φ(1− l)− pib (14)
Proposition 2 In the model with two-sided altruism, if savings and bequests are
interior, then parents invest the optimal level of human capital on the child. Moreover,
human capital is a normal good.
PROOF: See Appendix.
3.3 Conditional Cash Transfers: Efficiency vs Equity
We now introduce a social planner whose objective is to help households to invest
the optimal amount of human capital ho on the child. The planner implements the
following policy: It provides a transfer τ¯ to all households that invest at least the
optimal level of human capital. Formally,
τ =
 τ¯ if h ≥ h
o
0 otherwise
Let V (τ¯ , a, lo) denote the indirect utility of a household with income generating
ability a if it accepts the conditionality imposed by the policymaker. Similarly, let
V (0, a, l∗(a)) denote its indirect utility if it does not, where l∗(a) is the optimal choice
of child labor for a household that does not participate in the program. Clearly, a
household will accept the conditionality if V (τ¯ , a, lo) − V (0, a, l∗(a)) > 0. If child
labor is an inferior good, or equivalently, human capital investment is a normal good,
it can be shown that this difference is increasing on a, so better off households are
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more likely to accept the conditionality. Since the opportunity cost of participating
in the program is given by the foregone income coming from child labor, l∗(a)− lo, the
effective transfer received by a household with income generating ability a is given
by:
τ e(a) =
 τ¯ + l
o − l∗(a) if V (τ¯ , a, lo)) > V (0, a, l∗(a))
0 otherwise
Clearly, effective transfers τ e(a) are non-decreasing on a for households partici-
pating in the program.3 Therefore, within this group, better off households tend to
receive a larger positive impact from the program.
More generally, we can distinguish three types of households with choices depend-
ing on their income generating ability a. The first type of household invests less than
the optimal level of human capital ho even when the CCTS is available, so it does not
receive any transfer at all. The second type of household was investing less than the
optimal level ho before the scheme was available, but increases its investment level to
ho once he becomes a beneficiary of the program. Finally, the third type of household
was already investing the optimal level of human capital, so it always participate in
the program since it represents a pure income transfer to the household.
4 The Evaluation Problem
Although randomization helps to answer many of the questions raised by policy-
makers, there are many other questions that remain unanswered, in particular those
related with the distribution of program impacts across the population of beneficia-
ries.
To formalize the inferential problem, let each member j of population J be exposed
to a mutually exclusive and exhaustive binary set of treatments T = {0, 1}, and
3Given the assumptions of the model, in particular the concavity of φ(·), for any level of generating
ability a, lo is a lower bound for the optimal choice of child labor: i.e. l∗(a) ≥ lo
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have a response function yj(t) : T → R mapping treatments into outcomes. The
population is a probability space (J,Ω, P ) and y(·) : J → R×R is a random variable
mapping the population into their response functions. Therefore, there exist two
potential states of the world for each member j of J : (yj(0), yj(1)). Lets denote
program participation by the indicator variable dj, where dj = 1 indicates program
participation, and dj = 0 otherwise. The analyst observes dj, but he cannot observe
yj(0) and yj(1)) simultaneously. More formally, he observes yj = djyj(1) + (1 −
dj)yj(0). The fact that one cannot observe both outcomes for each individual is
known as the evaluation problem.
4.1 Average Treatment Effects
Following the traditional approach in the program evaluation literature, the aver-
age treatment effect on the treated (ATE) is given by
τ = E[y(1)− y(0)|d = 1] (15)
Randomization guarantees the identification of ATE since we have P (y0 | d = 1) =
P (y0 | d = 0). In fact, it turns out that ATE can be consistently estimated under the
weaker assumption that d is independent of y(0).4
Columns 2 and 3 reports estimated mean outcomes for treatment and control
samples, respectively. The first two rows concern total per capital expenditure and
total per capita purchase of food items. The fourth column provides average treatment
effects of the program on each of these variables. These results show that the effect of
Progresa on total monthly per capita expenditure was about 26 pesos (a 15% mean
effect), while its ATE on total monthly per capita food purchase was about 20 pesos.
These treatment effects are statistically significant at the 1% level.
4To see this point, decompose the difference E[y(1)] − E[y(0)] as follows E[y|d = 1] − E[y|d =
0)] = E[Y (0)|d = 1]− E[y(0)|d = 0] + τ = τ .
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Table 1: Per Capita Mean Outcomes and Treatment Effects
Outcome Treatment Control τ 95% CI
(n=6946) (m=4098)
Total Expenditure 202.815 176.341 26.474 [20.731,32.217]
(3.410)
Food Purchase 148.385 128.4156 19.970 [16.149,23.790]
(2.028)
From the discussion on the program evaluation problem, we know that the identi-
fication of the joint distribution P (y1, y0) is, in general, not possible. There is a case,
however, where one can identify the distribution of program impacts P (y1− y0). The
dummy-endogenous-variable model (Heckman 1978) assumes that
yj(1) = yj(0) + τ
Defining τ as the treatment effect, this assumption implies homogeneous treatment
responses. Therefore, the distribution of program impacts is the Dirac measure at τ :
P (y(1)− y(0) | d = 1) = P (τ | d = 1) (16)
Under random treatment selection, we have τ = E[y(1) − y(0)|d = 1], which is
identified. Hence, the dummy-endogenous variable model identifies the distribution
of program impacts.
4.2 Fre´chet Space
Because of the evaluation problem, one cannot observe an individual’s outcome
in both treatment and control states. Therefore, it is not possible to identify the
distribution of program impacts without imposing more structure on the problem at
hand. However, we may be able to partially identify some features of the distribution
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of the random vector (y(0), y(1)) when P (y(1)) and P (y(0)) are identified.5
Let us introduce the following notation. H denotes the bi-dimensional cumulative
distribution function of the random vector (y(0), y(1)), where H(t) = P (y0 ≤ t1, y1 ≤
t2), with t = (t1, t2) ∈ R2. H denotes the Fre´chet Space given the marginals, that is
H(F0, F1) is the space of all cumulative distribution functions H(t) on R2 with fixed
marginal cumulative distribution functions F0(t1) = P (y0 ≤ t1) and F1(t2) = P (y1 ≤
t2). We denote by EH the expectation operator under the joint distribution H.
Frechett (1951) showed that the distribution H(x1, x2) belongs to H(F0, F1) if and
only if
H−(t1, t2) ≤ H(t1, t2) ≤ H+(t1, t2) (17)
for all (t1, t2) ∈ R2 , where
H−(t1, t2) = max{F1(t2) + F0(t1)− 1, 0} (18)
H+(t1, t2) = min{F0(t1), F1(t2)} (19)
More recently, Ruschendorf (1981) showed that these bounds are sharp.
Tchen (1980) has established a result that will be proved to be very useful for
the purposes of the present analysis. This result states that nonnegative and convex
functions are monotone on the Fre´chet Space:
Lemma 1 (Tchen 1980) For any convex nonnegative function ψ defined on R,
EHψ(y1 − y0) ∈
[
EH+ψ(y1 − y0), EH−ψ(y1 − y0)
]
for all H ∈ H(F1, F2).
5For a review of the partial identification approach see Manski (2003).
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4.3 Partial Identification of Mobility Treatment Effects
Because of the evaluation problem, many distributional scenarios are consistent
with the data at hand. Could it be possible to ”measure” this multiplicity of scenarios
through some statistic? In this section we provide a way to do it by applying the
same kind of logic we can find in studies of economic mobility.
While the goal of analyzing treatment effects is to predict the outcomes that
would occur if different treatment rules were applied to the population (Manski 2003),
the study of economic mobility centers on quantifying the movement of the units of
analysis through the distribution of economic well-being over time. More precisely,
research on economic mobility tries to connect past and present, ”establishing how
dependent one’s current economic position is on one’s past position...” (Fields 2001).
In this sense, the analysis of economic mobility does not have to face the evaluation
problem since both states, past and present, are observed in principle.
Suppose for a moment that we were able to identify counterfactual outcomes for
two individuals. One of the individuals experiences a program impact of +100, the
other individual experiences a decrease in the outcome of interest of -100. Keeping
everything else constant, how much outcome movement has taken place? The stan-
dard approach to answer this question is to estimate the average treatment effect, so
the net effect of the treatment is zero. After this simple exercise, one is left with the
feeling that overall the treatment effect has been totally neutral. However, the fact
that the two individuals considered in this simple example registered changes in their
outcomes implies that the treatment is not neutral at all.
Fields and Ok (1996) define a measure of mobility that considers symmetric income
movements6 as
∫ | w−z | dH(w, z), where wi and zi are the incomes of individual i at
two different points on time. We can extend this measure to the context of program
6Symmetric outcome movement arises when individuals’ outcomes change from one state to
another and one is concerned about the magnitude of these fluctuations but not their direction.
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evaluation by redefining these variables, so our measure of mobility treatment effects
would be given by
m =
∫
| y1 − y0 | dH(y1, y0) (20)
In contrast to mobility analysis, when analyzing treatment effects one has no infor-
mation on counterfactual outcomes for the treated population, so we cannot identify
this measure. However, we can partially identify m since the absolute value function
is convex and positive (Lemma 3.1).
One complication arises since most data sets, and the Progresa data set is not
the exception, have unbalanced sample sizes, that is to say, the number of observa-
tions in the treatment group is not the same than the number of observations in the
control group. We circumvent this problem by using quantiles of the empirical distri-
butions Fˆ0 and Fˆ1
7. Table presents some estimations of m based on 100, 500, and 900
quantiles. The bootstrap confidence intervals were estimated using 2000 bootstrap
replications. The ratio mH+/mH− is around six to one, which indicates that a great
number of distributional scenarios are compatible with the data at hand. Because
Table 2: Mobility Treatment Effects
Number of Quantiles [mH+ ,mH− ] 95% Normal CI 90% Percentile CI
100 [25.719, 147.524] [21.167,151.148] [22.280, 152.076]
500 [26.461, 156.838] [22.156,161.246] [23.030, 160.954]
900 [26.004, 158.575] [21.609,163.339] [23.178, 162.985]
of the evaluation problem, one cannot discard the possibility of having an important
subset of the treated population receiving negative treatment effects when ATE are
strictly positive. Let L = {j ∈ J : yj(1) < yj(0)} denote the set of members of popu-
lation J that register a loss as a result of participating in the program. Although it
is not possible to identify the set of individuals who belong to this set in general, we
7The applied algorithm is described in more detail in Appendix B.
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can partially identify a parameter that may shed some light on the potential negative
effects of being exposed to the treatment, at least in average sense.8 We define the
average loss of participating in the program as follows9
LH =
∫
1L(y(1)− y(0))dH (21)
=
∫
min(y(1)− y(0), 0)dH (22)
Lemma 2 Sharp bounds on L are given by [LH− , LH+ ].
PROOF: See Appendix.
Table 3: Average Loss
Number of Quantiles [LH− , LH+ ] 95% Normal CI 90% Percentile CI
100 [-61.589,0.000] [-64.752,0.000] [-64.326,0.000]
500 [-66.062, -.724] [-69.784,0.000] [-69.083,-.004]
900 [-66.607, -.317] [-70.356,0.000] [-69.947,-.020]
Table 3 presents some estimations of L based on 100, 500, and 900 quantiles (the
bootstrap confidence intervals were also estimated using 2000 bootstrap replications).
Even though these worst case bounds may seem exaggerated at a first sight, espe-
cially the lower bound, they are a reminder that ATE may be missing a lot of relevant
information. This empirically corroborates the fact that the evaluation problem gen-
erally implies the existence of multiple distributional scenarios consistent with the
data generating process.
8Notice that these are worst case bounds. Monotonicity assumption motivated my program
design and economic theory can be proved to be very helpful to improve inference.
91L is the indicator function which is equal to one if j ∈ L, and 0 otherwise.
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5 Testing for Homogeneity in Program Impacts
In this section, we apply a partial identification approach that will allow us to
develop simple tests to evaluate the hypothesis of homogeneous treatment effects on
the treated.
Consider testing
H0 : y(1)− y(0) = c a.s.
versus
H1 : y(1)− y(0) 6= c a.s.
For some real number c = E(y1)− E(y0).
Define the functional
Φ(F0, F1) =
∫
ψ(y(1)− y(0))dH+ − ψ(
∫
y(1)dF1 −
∫
y(0)dF0) (23)
where ψ(·) : R → R+ belongs to the class of nonnegative and strictly convex real
valued functions. The following result will be proved to be very helpful for testing
the hypothesis of homogeneous program impacts:
Proposition 3 Let ψ(·) : R→ R+ be any nonnegative and strictly convex real valued
function. If Φ(F0, F1) > 0, then y(1)− y(0) 6= c a.s.
PROOF: See Appendix.
Therefore, we could test the hypothesis of homogeneity in program impacts through
testing the hypothesis H0 : Φ(F0, F1) = 0. As an example, let Wα denote the family
of functionals defined by
{
Φα(F0, F1) : Φα =
∫
(|y(1)− y(0)|αdH+ − |
∫
y(1)dF1 −
∫
y(0)dF0|α, α ≥ 2
}
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It can be shown that ψ(x) =| x |α is a strictly convex function10 for α ≥ 2 (See
Appendix). Therefore, Φα(F0, F1) > 0 implies y(1)− y(0) 6= c a.s.
From here, we can derive an indirect way of testing the null hypothesis by statis-
tically comparing the hypothesis
H0 : Φα(F0, F1) = 0
versus
H1 : Φα(F0, F1) 6= 0
Corollary 1 The hypothesis of homogeneous treatment effects can be rejected if
V ar(Y (1)) 6= V ar(Y (0))
PROOF: See Appendix.
Corollary 3.1 can be proved to be very helpful if we impose more structure on the
problem. Let Yi(1) ∼ N(µ1, σ21) and Yj(0) ∼ N(µ0, σ20), i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,m, be
two independent random samples. Notice that
S21/σ
2
1
S20/σ
2
0
∼ Fn−1,m−1
where S2i , i = 0, 1, is the sample variance, and Fn−1,m−1 is the F distribution with
n − 1 and m − 1 degrees of freedom. Therefore, if the populations are normally
distributed, we can test H0 by statistically testing the hypothesis
σ1
σ0
= 1.
Table 4: F test for H0 :
σ1
σ0
= 1
S20 S
2
1 f =
S21
S20
n m P (Fn−1,m−1 < f)
18791.13 27779.93 1.478 6946 4098 1
From table 3.4, it is clear that we can reject the hypothesis that both populations
share the same standard deviation. Consequently, the hypothesis of homogeneity
10Notice that V arH+(Y (0)− Y (1)) is a member of Wα since V arH+(Y (0)− Y (1)) = Φ2.
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in program impacts is also rejected. However, this test is not accurate unless the
distributions of the populations are close to normal.11
We also apply other tests for equality of variances that are less sensitive to de-
partures from normality. Levene’s test (1960) tends to be more robust than the F
test when the distribution is not Gaussian. Brown and Forsythe (1974) extended
Levene’s test to use either the median or the trimmed mean instead of the mean. Let
W0, W.50, and W.10 denote, respectively, the original Levene’s statistic, the Levene’s
statistic replacing the mean by the median, and the Levene’s statistic with a 10%
trimmed mean.12 All of these tests reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level (see
table 3.5).13
Table 5: Levene’s statistics
W0 W.10 W.50
9.003 7.796 8.019
Another alternative is to use bootstrap methods to estimate the distribution of the
statistic Φˆ by resampling the evaluation samples (Efron 1979). Let P (Φˆ−Φ | F0, F1)
denote the exact, finite sample distribution of Φˆ− Φ. Using standard notation from
the bootstrap literature, let Φˆ∗−Φˆ be computed from observations obtained according
to the empirical distributions Fˆ0 and Fˆ1 in the same way Φˆ−Φ is computed from the
true observations Yi(1) ∼ F1 and Yj(0) ∼ F0, i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,m. Finally, let
Q∗β denote the β-quantile of the CDF of Φˆ
∗ − Φˆ. That is
Q∗β = inf{Φˆ∗ : P (Φˆ∗ − Φˆ | Fˆ0, Fˆ1) ≥ β} (24)
11A skewness and kurtosis test rejects the hypothesis of normality. In fact, the hypothesis of
symmetry can also be easily rejected.
12Brown and Forsythe(1974) reached the conclusion that using the trimmed mean performed
best when the underlying data followed a Cauchy distribution (i.e., heavy-tailed) and the median
performed best when the underlying data followed a (i.e., skewed) distribution. Using the mean
provided the best power for symmetric, moderate-tailed, distributions
13The Levene’s test rejects the null hypothesis if W > F1,n+m−2 where F1,n+m−2 is the upper
critical value of the F distribution for some predetermined significance level.
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A commonly applied method to testH0 is to assume that Φˆ−Φ is normally distributed,
and then to use the bootstrap estimate of the standard deviation as an approximate
estimator of the true sample variance. That is
Φˆ− Φ
σˆ∗
∼ N(0, 1) (25)
However, under the null, Φ is at the boundary of the parameter space since Φ ≥ 0.
This implies that the random quantity Φˆ/σˆ∗ is always positive, and hence it cannot
be normally distributed with mean zero and variance one.
One possible solution for this problem is to follow Efron (1987) by assuming the
existence of a monotone increasing transformation ϕ(·) : R→ R such that
ϕ(Φˆ)− ϕ(Φ) ∼ N(zΦ, σ2Φ) (26)
for every choice of Φ (zΦ is know as the bias correction term). For the purpose of
the present study, we can weaken this assumption by requiring just symmetry for the
distribution of ϕ(Φˆ)− ϕ(Φ).
Proposition 4 Suppose there exists a strictly increasing function ϕ(·) : R→ R such
that
ϕ(Φˆ)− ϕ(Φ) | F0, F1 ∼ V
ϕ(Φˆ∗)− ϕ(Φˆ) | Fˆ0, Fˆ1 ∼ V
where V is continuously and symmetrically distributed about γ ∈ R, satisfying
FV (2γ + F
−1(β)) > 0
for some β ∈ (0, 1/2). Then
Reject H0 if min Φˆ
∗ > 0
21
is a level β test.
PROOF: See Appendix.
We estimate the bootstrap cdf of Φˆ∗2 using B = 2000 bootstrap replications.
From table 3.6, it can be inferred that the null hypothesis of homogeneous treatment
effects can be easily rejected under the assumptions of the proposition. For instance,
if V ∼ N(−σγ, σ2), we have
P (ϕ(Ψˆ∗)− ϕ(Ψˆ)) = P (σZ − σγ < 0)
= P (Z < γ)
= FZ(γ)
A plug in estimator for γ is therefore given by
γˆ = F−1Z
(
#{ϕ(Φˆ∗) < ϕ(Φˆ)}
B
)
= F−1Z
(
#{Φˆ∗ < Φˆ}
B
)
where the last equality follows from the monotonicity of ϕ(·). As expected, the sign
of this parameter is strictly negative, taking values in the range (F−1Z (.25), F
−1
Z (.50))
for #q ∈ {100, 300, 600, 800, 1000}, where #q indicates the number of quantiles used
in the estimation. Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level under
the assumption of normality.
Andrews (2000) argues that the bootstrap may not be consistent when the pa-
rameter of interest is on a boundary of the parameter space. One possible solution is
to draw subsamples of size k < min(n,m) from the original data with replacement.
This sampling method is identical to the standard bootstrap in every aspect, but the
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size of each replication.14 Another possible advantage of this method is that we can
estimate the bootstrap distribution of Φˆ∗ without using the quantiles of the empirical
distributions as the original data. Table 3.7 presents several quantiles of the boot-
strap distribution of Φˆ∗2 for k ∈ {1000, 2000, 3000, 3500, 4000}. Under the assumption
of normality and bias correction, the hypothesis of homogeneity in program impacts
can be rejected at the 1% level.
6 Identification of Program Impacts under Mono-
tonicity Assumptions
The bounds implied by the Fre´chet Space of bivariate distributions proved to be
very helpful for developing a test for homogeneity of program impacts. However, with-
out further assumptions, it is an impossible task to pin down the actual distribution
of treatment effects even in the case of a random experiment.
Inference on the distribution of program impacts may be improved by imposing
assumptions implied by economic theory or any other mechanism related with the
data generating process such as program design. Manski (1997) investigates what
may be learned about treatment response under the assumptions of monotone, semi-
monotone, and concave-monotone response functions. He shows that these assump-
tions have identifying power, particularly when compared to a situation where no prior
information exists (worst case bounds). Typically, the type of monotonicity assump-
tions applied by econometricians dealing with partially identified parameters take
some form of stochastic dominance. For instance, in a missing treatments environ-
ment, Molinari (2005) shows that one can extract information from the observations
14Bickel et al (1997) discuss a number of resampling schemes under which the size of the sample
replication is smaller than the original sample size. They argue than the k out of n sampling scheme
works very well in all known realistic examples of bootstrap failure.
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for which treatment data are missing using monotonicity assumptions. Specifically,
one could assume that the effect of a social program on the outcome of interest cannot
be negative. This is equivalent to assume that for each j in J we have
τj = max{yj(1)− yj(0), 0} (27)
Given the design of Progresa, this seems to be a reasonable assumption. One can
expect a positive effect on the outcome of interest, in our case consumption, for
treated individuals. Moreover, this type of assumption implies first order stochastic
dominance (FSD) of distribution P (y(1)) over distribution P (y(0)): i.e. P (y1 ≤ x) ≤
P (y0 ≤ x) for all x ∈ R. Actually, this assumption is stronger than FSD. It implies
that, for all t ∈ R, we have
P (y(1) ≥ t | y(0) = t) = 1 (28)
Notice that the converse is not always true, that is to say, stochastic dominance does
not necessarily imply monotonicity.15
From section 3.3, we know that if human capital is a normal good, a policy-
maker implementing a CCTS faces a dilemma: on the one hand, it may represent
a very helpful policy tool for achieving an efficient level of human capital. On the
other hand, this policy instrument may be at odds with a more equal distribution
of effective benefits. In particular, it was argued that when the conditioned-on good
is normal, better-off households tend to receive larger ”effective” benefits, once the
opportunity cost of foregone earnings from child labor is deducted. Unfortunately,
because of the evaluation problem, we cannot test this hypothesis without imposing
more assumptions. We circumvent this problem by establishing a different type of
15To see that, just observe the random vector (y(0), y(1)) whose support consists of two points:
(1,3) and (2,1). Clearly y(1) stochastically dominates y(0), but the monotonicity assumption is
violated.
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monotonicity assumption, one that will allow us to test the hypothesis of regressivity
in program impacts.
We assume the existence of a non-decreasing real valued function φ(·) : R → R
such that
yj(1) = φ(yj(0)) (29)
Notice that function φ(·) is not indexed, and in consequence this assumption implies
rank preservation among the members of population J . More precisely, in the contest
of program evaluation, rank preservation means that, for some outcome of interest Y ,
the rank of a particular unit of observation i with respect to any other observation j
is the same in both treatment and control states. More formally, rank preservation
implies that, for any two members i and j of population J , the following relation
holds:
(yi(0), yi(1)) ≥ (yj(0), yj(1))
This untestable assumption is also a necessary condition for the existence of regressive
program impacts16.
Let τ(y(0)) = φ(y(0))−y(0). We say that there is regressivity in program impacts
whenever τ(y(0)) is a non-decreasing and non-trivial function of y(0), that is, for any
i, j ∈ J , such that yi(0) > yj(0), we have17
φ(yi(0))− φ(yj(0))
yi(0)− yj(0) ≥ 1 (30)
In order to make this result operational, and to test the hypothesis of regressivity in
program impacts, we will use quantile treatment effects18(QTE), which are a natural
16Let (yi(0), yi(1)) and (yi(0), yi(1)) be the outcomes in both states for i, j ∈ J . Without loss
of generality, let yi(0) > yj(0). Regressivity in program impacts is equivalent to yi(1) − yi(0) >
yi(1)− yi(0), which implies yi(1) > yj(1)
17More precisely, there is regressivity in program impacts if τ(y(0)) is a non-decreasing and non-
trivial function almost everywhere.
18See Koenker and Bassett (1978) for an application of quantile estimation to a regression setting.
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extension of rank preservation to the analysis of distribution of treatment effects.
Let us introduce this concept more formally. The qth quantile of distribution Fi(y),
i = 0, 1 is defined as:
yi(q) = inf{y : Fi(y) ≥ q}
The following result will be proved to be useful for the empirical application. It shows
the existence of the function φ(·) under some mild continuity assumption:
Lemma 3 If y0(q) is a continuity point of F0, then there exists a non-decreasing
function φ(q) : (0, 1)→ R such that y1(q) = φ(y0(q)); moreover, there exists a unique
function τ(q) satisfying τ(q) = y1(q)− y0(q).
PROOF: See Appendix.
The QTE for quantile q can be defined as the difference in treatment status
between quantile q of treatment group and quantile q of control group. Formally,
QTE for quantile q is given by
τ(q) = y1(q)− y0(q)
Therefore, QTE represent an alternative way for testing for regressivity in program
impacts. A non decreasing and non-trivial QTE function is strong evidence for re-
gressive program impacts under the assumption of rank preservation, where for rank
preservation we mean rank preservation in terms of quantiles of the distributions F1
and F0.
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 introduce the QTE estimator for per capita total expenditures
and per capita food purchase, respectively, for several quantiles. These quantiles
were estimated simultaneously, so statistical comparisons can be made among them.
Empirical variance of QTE was calculated by means of 200 bootstrap replications of
the quantile treatment effect.
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We plot these QTE in figures 3.1 and 3.2. For comparison purposes, we plot the
average treatment effect as a horizontal dashed line. Dotted lines surrounding the
ATE line represent a 95% confidence interval. Clearly, the variation of the treatment
effects across the different quantiles is both economically and statistically significant,
particularly at the extremes of the QTE plot, although for a broad band treatment
effects are statistically homogeneous.
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Figure 1: Quantile Treatment Effects: Total Expenditure
The QTE estimators are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model:
better off households tend to receive larger positive impacts from the program which
generates the monotonically increasing shape of the QTE. This characteristic of the
QTE for PROGRESA is more remarkable when one contrast que treatment effect
between the lower 20 and the upper 20 centiles. For instance, in the case of total
expenditure, the treatment effect for the 95th centile is about five times the treatment
effect estimated for the 5th centile. This gap is about 10 times between the same
Abadie, Angrist, and Imbens (2002) extend their idea to the estimation of quantile treatment effects.
See Appendix C for a description of the QTE estimator.
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Figure 2: Quantile Treatment Effects: Food Purchase
quantiles in the case of food purchase.
QTE estimation also represents an alternative method to test for homogeneity in
program impacts under some mild regularity conditions. This assertion is formalized
in the following Lemma:
Lemma 4 If treatment effects are homogeneous across the population, then τ(q) = τ
for all q ∈ [0, 1] such that y0(q) is a continuity point of F0.
PROOF: See Appendix.
From tables 3.7 and 3.8, we can conclude that the hypothesis of homogeneity in
program impacts can be rejected under the conditions of Lemma 3.4.
7 Conclusions
Conditional cash transfers represent an important policy tool for fighting poverty,
particularly when there is some type of externality that prevents the poor from reach-
ing more efficient equilibria. Human capital investment is just one example of an
32
activity generating positive externalities. Correcting for these externalities is then an
important step to break the circle of intergenerational poverty.
There are some issues, however, that should be considered by policymakers imple-
menting this type of programs. If the conditioned-on good is normal, then it is very
likely that the distributional effects of the program will be far from being distribu-
tionally neutral. In fact, as we saw in the empirical analysis, heterogeneous treatment
effects are pervasive, at least in the case of the Progresa evaluation sample.
Under the assumption of rank preservation, program impacts tend to be distri-
butionally regressive for the population participating in Progresa. As it was argued
in the text, this finding is also consistent with the fact that the conditioned-on good
is normal. Therefore, if the assumption of rank preservation is correct, the poorest
of the poor may not be receiving as much benefits as policymakers believe they are.
This has important implications for the design of antipoverty policies: policymak-
ers should consider the existent tradeoff between equity and efficiency of outcomes
in order to better understand the consequences and limitations of CCTS like Pro-
gresa. The final answer will much depend on the benefits and costs of improving the
targeting efficiency of a program.
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Appendix A: Proofs and Derivations
Proof of Proposition 3.1: The household bargaining model is solved through
the program
L = (xα1fxα2f (φ(1− l) + b)1−α)γ(xβ1mxβ2m(h(1− l) + b)1−β)1−γ +
λ1(a+ l − s− x1f − x1m) +
λ2(a+ s+ (1− pi)φ(1− l)− pib− x2f − x2m) +
λ3s+ λ4b
from where we can obtain the following first order conditions:
z1
x1f
= λ1
z1
x2f
= λ2
z3
x1m
= λ1
z4
x2m
= λ2
−z2φ′(1− l)
φ(1− l) + b + λ1 − λ2(1− pi)φ
′(1− l) = 0
z2
φ(1− l) + b − λ2pi + λ4 = 0
−λ1 + λ2 + λ3 = 0
where z1 = αγ, z2 = (1 − α)γ + (1 − β)(1 − γ), and z3 = β(1 − γ). From the first
order conditions we have
x1m =
z3
z1
x1f
x2m =
z3
z1
x2f
z2φ
′(h)
φ(h) + b
=
z1
x1f
34
and
φ′(h) ≥ 1
with the last condition holding with equality if (b, s) ∈ R2++.
For the second part, assume the household is both savings and bequest con-
strained, so b = s = 0. Assume also that it receives an exogenous transfer of income
ω > 0 in period 1. From the first order conditions
φ′(1− l)
φ(1− l) =
z1
z2x1f
=
z3
z2x1m
Since the household is both bequest an savings constrained, we have l∗ < lo and
x1f + x1m = a + ω + l. Assume, towards a contradiction, that child labor does not
decrease: i.e. ∆l ≥ 0. Hence, either x1f or x1m increases. This fact and the condition
above together imply an increase in child labor, a contradiction. Therefore, human
capital is a normal good. 
Proof of Proposition 3.2: The proof for the first part of the proposition is
along the lines of the case with one-sided altruism. To prove that human capital is a
normal good, assume the household receives an exogenous positive transfer in period
1, say ∆ω > 0. If the household is both saving and bequest constrained, then the
budget constraint in period 1 is given by x1m + x1f = a + ∆ω + l. Assume, towards
a contradiction, that child labor increases. From the first order conditions, both x1m
and x1m increase in equilibrium. From the first order conditions, we also have:
z3
x1f
=
z2 +
[
z4
(
z4+z1
z1
)]
(1− pi)
a+ (1− pi)
 φ′(1− l)
φ(1− l)
This is clearly a contradiction since the left-hand side of the equation strictly de-
creases, while the right-hand side increases or remains constant.
Lemma 5 Sharp bounds on the correlation coefficient ρY0,Y1 are given by
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[ρY0,Y1H+ , ρ
Y0,Y1
H− ]
PROOF:
ρY0,Y1 =
V ar(Y1 − Y0)− V ar(Y1)− V ar(Y0)
2
√
V ar(Y0)V ar(Y1)
=
E(Y1 − Y0)2 − (E(Y1)− E(Y0))2 − V ar(Y1)− V ar(Y0)
2
√
V ar(Y0)V ar(Y1)
Since ϕ(x) = x2 is a convex function, the result follows from Lemma 3.1. Sharpness
follows from the fact that H− and H+ are sharp bounds on the Fre´chet Space.
Proof of Lemma 3.2 : Notice that the absolute value of the program impact
can be decomposed as follows
| y(1)− y(0) |= y(1)− y(0)− 2 min(y(1)− y(0), 0)
Taking expectations at both sides of the equality, we have
m = E(y(1)− y(0))− 2L
From where
L =
E(y(1)− y(0))−m
2
(31)
Since m is positive, the result follows from Lemma 3.1. Alternatively, we can apply
Lemma 3.1 directly by noticing that
min(y(1)− y(0), 0) = −max(y(0)− y(1), 0)
and ϕ(x) = max(x, 0) is a convex function.
Proof of Proposition 3.3: By Lemma 3.1 and the Frechet bounds, we have
∫
ψ(y1 − y0)dH − ψ(
∫
y1dF1 −
∫
y0dF0) ≥ Φ(F0, F1)
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for all H ∈ H(F1, F0). Define a random variable Z = Y1− Y0. By Jensen’s inequality
∫
ψ(z)dH+ ≥ ψ(
∫
zdH+)
= ψ(
∫
y1dH+ −
∫
y0dH+)
= ψ(
∫
y1dF1 −
∫
y0dF0)
which is equivalent to Φ(F0, F1) ≥ 0. The result follows by using the fact that Jensen’s
inequality holds with equality for the case of strictly convex functions if and only if
Y1 − Y0 is a constant with probability 1.
Proof of Corollary 3.1: Notice that
Φ2 = V arH+(Y (1)− Y (0))
= σ21 + σ
2
0 − 2ρH+σ1σ0
≥ σ21 + σ20 − 2σ1σ0
= (σ1 − σ0)2
where ρH+ is the correlation coefficient evaluated at H+. Hence σ1 6= σ0 implies
Φ2 > 0, and the result follows from Proposition 3.3.
Proof of Corollary 3.1 when y(1) and y(0) are members of the same
location-scale family. Since y0 and y1 are members of the same location-scale
family, we have
yi = σiZ + µi
for i = 0, 1, where Z ∼ f(z). Because for any location-scale family it is possible
to choose f(z) such that EZ = 0 and EZ2=1, without loss of generality, we choose
these values for the first and second moment of Z. Notice that the extreme joint
distribution H+ is obtained when there is maximum correlation between y1 and y0.
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This occurs when high values of y1 are ”matched” with high values of y0. This is
equivalent to form the pairs (σ0z + µ0, σ1z + µ1) for all z in the support of Z. Hence
∫
(y(1)− y(0))2dH+ =
∫
[(σ1 − σ0)z + (µ1 − µ0)]2df(z)
= EZ [((σ1 − σ0)2Z2 + 2(σ1 − σ0)(µ1 − µ0)Z + (µ1 − µ0)2]
= (σ1 − σ0)2 + (µ1 − µ0)2
The result follows from Proposition 3.3.
Proof of Proposition 3.4: Notice that to test the hypothesis H0 : Φ = 0 is
equivalent to test Hϕ0 : ϕ(Φ) = ϕ(0). A level β ∈ (0, 1/2) for the latter hypothesis is
given by
Reject Hϕ0 : ϕ(Φ) = ϕ(0) if V1−β − γ < ϕˆ− ϕ(0)
where Vβ = F
−1(β). This a straightforward result since under the null we have
P (V1−β − γ < ϕˆ− ϕ(0)) = β
I will refer to this test as T1 for the rest of the proof. Let G(s) = P (ϕ
∗ < s) be the
bootstrap cdf of ϕ∗. Since ϕ∗ = ϕˆ− γ + V , we have
G(s) = P (V < s− ϕˆ+ γ)
= FV (s− ϕˆ+ γ)
with inverse G−1(β) = F−1V (β) + ϕˆ− γ. I claim that the test T2 defined as
Reject Hϕ0 if ϕ(0) < G
−1(FV (2γ + Vβ))
is equivalent to T1. This is true since
G−1(FV (2γ + Vβ)) = 2γ + Vβ + ϕˆ− γ
= γ − V1−β + ϕ
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It follows that the test T3
Reject Hϕ0 if ϕ(0) < minϕ(Φˆ
∗)
is a level β test since, for some β ∈ (0, 1/2)
ϕ(0) < minϕ(Φˆ∗)
≤ G−1(FV (2γ + Vβ))
Finally, let H(s) = P (Ψˆ∗ < s) be the bootstrap cdf of Ψˆ∗. Since ϕ(·) is a strictly
increasing transformation, the quantiles of ϕ(Ψˆ∗) coincide with those of Ψˆ∗. Hence,
T3 is equivalent to
Reject H0 : Ψ = 0 if 0 < min Ψˆ
∗
since minϕ(Ψˆ∗) = ϕ(min Ψˆ∗). This completes the proof. 
Lemma 6 ψ(x) =| x |α is a strictly convex function for α ≥ 2
PROOF: For α = 2, the result is immediate since ψ(x) = x2, and ψ′′ > 0. For
α > 2, we make use of Pecaric and Dragomir’s inequality, which indicates that if
pq(q + p) > 0, z1, z2 ∈ R, and α ≥ 1, then
| z1 + z2 |α
p+ q
≤ | z1 |
α
p
+
| z2 |α
q
w.l.g. define z1 = λx, z2 = (1− λ)y, x, y ∈ R, p = λ, q = 1− λ, and λ ∈ (0, 1). Then
we have λ(1− λ) > 0, and hence
| λx+ (1− λ)y |α ≤ | λx |
α
λ
+
| (1− λ)y |α
1− λ
= λα−1 | x |α +(1− λ)α−1 | y |α
< λ | x |α +(1− λ) | y |α
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Where I have used the fact that λα−1 < λ and (1− λ)α−1 < (1− λ), for α > 2.
Proof of Lemma 3.3: Let τ(y0(q)) and φ(·) be defined, respectively, by
τ(y0(q)) = inf{ξ : q ≤ F1(y0(q) + ξ)}
and
φ(y0(q)) = F
−1
1 (F0(y0(q)))
From the quantile function, we have
y1(q) = F
−1
1 (q) = inf{x : F (y(1) ≤ x) > q}
Hence,
y1(q) = φ(y0(q)) = F
−1
1 (q) = τ(y0(q)) + y0(q)
The result follows by noticing that φ(y0(q)) is a non-decreasing function of y0(q). For
a proof of uniqueness see Doksum (1974).
Proof of Lemma 3.4: Doksum (1974) shows that if τ(x)) = τ for x in the
support of y(0), then F0(x) = F1(x+ τ) for all x. Therefore
F0(y0(q)) = F1(y0(q) + τ)
From the proof of Lemma 3.3, we have
y1(q) = F
−1
1 (F0(y0(q))) = y0(q) + τ
The result follows.
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Appendix B: Estimation and Bootstrap Algorithm
using the Empirical Quantiles
The objective is to estimate bootstrap confidence intervals for the parameters
θ− = EH− [φ(y1 − y0)] and θ+ = EH+ [φ(y1 − y0)], for some measurable function
φ(·). The data in this problem consists of two independent random samples drawn
Yi(1) ∼ F1 and Yj(0) ∼ F0, i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,m. Let Fˆ1 and Fˆ0 denote the
empirical distribution functions implied by these samples.
1. Estimation of θ− and θ+
1) Estimate b = [γmin{n,m}] empirical quantiles for F1 and F0, where γ ∈ (0, 1)
and [·] is the integer function. More precisely, for each t ∈ {t1, . . . , tb}, i = 1, 2, we
estimate
q
tj
i = inf{x : Fˆi(y(i) ≤ x) ≥ tj} (32)
2) Let Qˆ1 and Qˆ0 be the empirical distribution function of the quantiles estimated
above, that is to say, a distribution placing a probability mass 1
b
to each of these
quantiles:
Qˆi(x) =
1
b
b∑
j=1
1(q
tj
i ≤ x) (33)
3) For all x = (x1, x2) ∈ R2, define
Hˆ−(x1, x2) = max{Qˆ0(x1) + Qˆ1(x2)− 1, 0} (34)
Hˆ+(x1, x2) = min{Qˆ0(x1), Qˆ1(x2)} (35)
4) Estimate θ using plug-in estimators: θˆ− = θ(Hˆ−) and θˆ+ = θ(Hˆ+).
2. Estimation of the Extreme distributions H− and H+
Define the sequences of quantiles of F1 and F0, respectively, by {qtj1 } and {qtj0 }.
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Let µi = EQi [q
t
i ] denote the expected value of the chosen quantiles under probability
measure Qi. The correlation coefficient between q
t
1 and q
t
0 is given by
ρ(qt0, q
t
1) =
1
b
∑
(q
tj
1 − µ1)(qtj0 − µ0) (36)
By Lemma 3.5, we know that this coefficient is at its minimum when it is evaluated
at H+, and is at its maximum when evaluated at H−. We can estimate the extreme
distributions H− and H+ by applying the following result:
Lemma 7 (Hardy, Littlewood, and Polya 1952) The sum of products
∑
i xiyi is
a maximum when both {xi} and {yi} are increasing, and a minimum when one is
increasing and the other is decreasing.
Therefore. by defining xj = (q
tj
1 − µ1) and yj = (qtj1 − µ0), it follows that H+ is
obtained by pairing the largest quantile of F1 with the largest quantile of F0, the
second largest quantile of F1 with the second largest quantile of F0, and so on. To
construct H−, we just need to pair the largest quantile of F1 with the smallest quantile
of F0, the second largest quantile of F1, with the second smallest quantile of F0, and
so on.
3. Bootstrap
5) Generate bootstrap random samples from Fˆ1 and Fˆ0: Y
∗
i (1) ∼ F1 and Y ∗j (0) ∼
F0, i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,m.
Let F ∗1 and F
∗
0 denote the empirical distributions implied by the bootstrap random
samples. That is
F ∗i (x) =
1
b
∑
j
1(yij ≤ x) (37)
6) Replicate steps 1)-4) above for the bootstrap distributions F ∗1 and F
∗
0 . That is:
6a) Estimate b empirical quantiles for F ∗1 and F
∗
0
q
tj∗
i = inf{x : F ∗i (y∗(i) ≤ x) ≥ tj} (38)
42
6b) Let Q∗1 and Q
∗
0 be the empirical distribution of the quantiles estimated above,
that is to say, a distribution placing a probability mass 1
b
to each of these quantiles.
Q∗i (x) =
1
b
b∑
j=1
1(q
tj∗
i ≤ x) (39)
6c) Define
H∗−(x1, x2) = max{Q∗0(x1) +Q∗1(x2)− 1, 0} (40)
H∗+(x1, x2) = min{Q∗0(x1), Q∗1(x2)} (41)
6d) Estimate θ∗− and θ
∗
+, respectively, by θ
∗
− = θ(H
∗
−) and θ
∗
+ = θ(Hˆ
∗
+).
7) Repeated independent generation of F ∗1 and F
∗
0 yields a sequence of independent
realizations of θ∗+ and θ
∗
−, which can be used to approximate their actual bootstrap
distribution.
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Appendix C: Quantile Treatment Effects
Let Qq(Y | T ) be the conditional quantile function of the conditional distribution
F (Y | T ), where T ∈ {0, 1} is the binary variable indicating treatment status: it
takes the value of 1 if treated, and 0 otherwise. Assume F (Y | T ) is continuous and
strictly increasing, and that Qq(Y | T ) is linear:
Qq(Y | T ) = αq + βqT
It can be shown that the parameters αq and βq can be characterized as follows (Koenker
1978)
(αq, βq) = arg min(α,β)∈R2 E[ρq(Y − α− βT )]
where ρq(u) = u(q − I(u < 0)) is the check function. Let α∗ and β∗ be the solution
to this problem. Then it is easy to show that the QTE can be recovered from here
since
τ(q) = y1(q)− y0(q) = Qq(Y | T = 1)−Qq(Y | T = 0) = β∗q
For the estimation, let (yi, Ti)
n
i=1 be a sample from the population. Then we can
apply the analog principle and follow Koenker and Bassett (1978) to estimate α and
β:
(αˆq, βˆq) = arg min(α,β)∈R2 n−1
∑n
i=1 ρq(Yi − α− βTi)
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